National Broadband Policies and Market Development

The Need for Broadband Policies
An increasing number of countries across Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have adopted a national broadband plan to foster broadband access. Today 15 countries out of 19 in the region have adopted such a strategy or policy document and one other country is about to do so (see table 2.1).
The adoption of a national broadband plan means that a country is making specific efforts to stimulate broadband market development in a systematic and holistic way with all key stakeholders. Indeed, all the countries in MENA with high penetration rates first adopted a broadband policy. At the core of such a plan are national targets for broadband penetration or coverage (see the Arab Republic of Egypt's National Broadband Plan summarized in box 2.1 as an example). These targets may differ across the region owing to existing broadband infrastructure, degree of competition in the telecommunications market, income levels of the population, and the state of government finances, especially when public funding is explored. Considering the diverse situation across broadband markets in MENA, there is indeed no "one size fits all" approach to national broadband strategies as there cannot be a single set of policy recommendations for the region as a whole. Therefore, it is crucial that national broadband policies should be well formulated according to the stage of broadband market development of each individual country with emphasis on those areas that are the most relevant for that stage. This enables the government to introduce adequate and, just as importantly, timely regulatory and policy measures which may effectively contribute to further market development while taking into account the specific situation of each country.
Few examples of harmonized regional broadband strategies exist. The Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) is one of the rare examples aiming to harmonize national broadband policies across the 27 European Union (EU) member states forming a unified economic zone. Quantitative targets in terms of implementation time, broadband coverage, and speed vary across different EU member states (box 2.2). But a harmonized approach for broadband development is
C H A P T E R 2 Box 2.1 Egypt's National Broadband Plan
The Arab Republic of Egypt's "eMisr National Broadband Plan" is a two-stage plan: the first phase lists strategic options and recommendations to achieve set targets; the second phase (2Q 2012) details a list of action items with timelines and responsibilities needed for the execution of the plan.
Coverage targets:
Fixed: 75 percent of households (HH) have access to 2 megabits per second (Mbps) by 2015; 90 percent of HH have access to 25 Mbps by 2012;
Mobile: 98 percent of population coverage of third generation of mobile telecommunications technology (3G) by 2015; 90 percent of population coverage with fourth generation of mobile telecommunications technology/long-term evolution (4G/LTE) by 2021.
Penetration targets:
Fixed: ~22 percent of HH subscribed to broadband by 2015; ~40 percent of HH subscribed to broadband by 2021;
Mobile: ~10 percent of citizens subscribed by 2015; ~15 percent of citizens subscribed by 2021.
Social targets:
By 2015: 50 percent of Egyptian communities connected to 25 Mbps; 50 percent of third-level Egyptian administrative localities (Sheyakha and Village) served with at least one Public Access Point with 25 Mbps.
By 2021: 100 percent of Egyptian communities connected to 25 Mbps; each third-level Egyptian administrative locality (Sheyakha and Village) served with at least one Public Access Point with 25 Mbps. It is estimated that by achieving short-term targets alone, broadband will create 6,650-17,500 direct jobs on average per year and will result in an incremental cumulative contribution to gross domestic product of US$4.17 billion.
The estimated investment required over the four-year forecast period-to achieve the set availability, penetration, and social targets-is projected to be in the range of US$2.40 billion to US$3.95 billion.
To encourage investment in areas where deploying broadband services may not be economically viable, government stimulation of up to 20 percent of the total needed investment would be required.
In order to stimulate the demand needed for a successful broadband diffusion, an investment in the range of US$350 million will be needed, as per the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, over four years.
Source: eMisr National Broadband Plan, 2011, http://www.tra.gov.eg/emisr/Summary_En.pdf. a common regulatory framework to MENA, in particular in any sub-regional economic zone (e.g., Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab Maghreb Union). This is particularly important for investment, as investors increasingly view the region as a single market, but they need to adapt to multiple regulatory frameworks, local laws, regulations, and institutions for each of their investments in the region.
Box 2.2 Broadband Policy: Objectives and Implementation of the Digital Agenda for Europe
The Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) includes the objective to bring "basic" broadband to all citizens of the European Union (EU) by 2013. Eight EU member states (Denmark, Finland, France, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) have already achieved full coverage for "basic" broadband services and a further 17 have set a corresponding quantitative target, or are about to do so. In many cases the timing is more ambitious than the DAE deadline of 2013. There is a range of definitions of "basic" download speeds from 512 kilobits per second (kbps) to 4 megabits (Mbps) adopted across the EU countries, while the definition of "basic" broadband on the EU level refers to always-on service with a speed exceeding 144 kbps.
Beyond the "basic" broadband target, the DAE includes an additional objective to ensure that by 2020 all Europeans have access to much higher Internet speeds of above 30 Mbps and 50 percent or more of European households (HH) subscribe to Internet connections above 100 Mbps. When it comes to ultra fast broadband (UFB), the level of ambition of EU countries in terms of coverage targets varies greatly (See table B2.2.1). Some have not yet adopted any coverage targets, whereas a group of more advanced countries is pursuing objectives well beyond the coverage target specified in the DAE (up to 1,000/500 Mbps for download/upload by 2020 in Luxembourg). So far, 21 member states have defined quantitative coverage objectives for UFB with download targets ranging from 25 Mbps to 1 gigabit per second (Gbps) and with coverage footprints between 75 and 100 percent of households or population. 
Three Core Objectives of Broadband Policy and Three Stages of Market Development
Traditionally, the building blocks of any broadband policy are grouped around three core objectives:
• Access (sometimes also referred to as Supply or Connectivity), with the objective to bring networks everywhere and to improve availability of broadband; • Adoption (sometimes also referred to as Demand or Usage), with the objective to stimulate and to make usage of networks deployed more effective; and • Competition, with the objective to maintain a competitive environment able to sustain growth of broadband penetration, and drive innovation and deliver consumer benefits.
The priority of these objectives will vary according to the phase of market development. Development of broadband, like any innovation, tends to follow an s-shaped curve (see box 2.3). The s-curve reflects the three stages or phases in the evolution of a market: Emerging (or Introductory) Developing, and Mature.
Box 2.3 Broadband Diffusion Curve
The s-curve reflects the three stages in the evolution of a market: emerging (or introductory), developing, and mature (see figure B2 .3.1). The emerging stage is prior to the first inflection; the developing stage is between the first and second inflections; and the mature stage is after the second inflection. Adoption is slow initially but accelerates rapidly before stabilizing as it reaches maturity. The particular shape of the curve (namely its slope and the points of inflection) will differ between countries as a result of differences in policy and regulatory framework, income per capita, the availability and penetration of substitute and complementary products, and the diffusion of precursor innovations and products. Figure B2 .3.2 provides some examples of s-curves representing broadband market development. For instance, in the case of the Republic of Korea, a good combination of supply and demand policies has stimulated the diffusion of broadband in its early stages affecting the shape of the s-curve.
The price of broadband service plays a critical role in terms of broadband diffusion. According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), broadband penetration grows rapidly after the level of retail broadband price falls below 3-5 percent of average monthly income. In the MENA region, fixed broadband price constitutes ~3.6 percent of the average monthly income per capita, while mobile broadband prices stands at ~7.7 percent. While Djibouti, Syria, and the Republic of Yemen are significantly above the 5 percent threshold, a number of countries (i.e., Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) have just reached the level that makes rapid broadband takeoff possible (see figure 2.1).
If we look in particular at the countries in the emerging (or Introductory) phase, we can observe that in most cases, there is a lack of competitive market conditions. For instance, in the case of Djibouti the high price of mobile broadband is consistent with the low penetration of third generation of mobile telecommunications technology (3G) in the country, that is, 2.22 percent per 100 inhabitants. In Syria, the Republic of Yemen, and Tunisia, low 3G penetration (4.33 percent, 1.82 percent and 5.10 percent per 100 inhabitants, respectively) is consistent with the high price of mobile broadband as a percentage of average income. By contrast in Jordan, a more affordable mobile broadband price constitutes a less significant portion of average income, which supports a much higher penetration rate of 3G (above 50 percent). Figure 2 .2 illustrates the correlation between a mobile broadband price basket as a percentage of overall average income of the poorest 60 percent of the population and broadband penetration rates. It also indicates that countries with lower mobile broadband prices tend to have a higher number of mobile broadband providers.
There is a similar correlation for fixed broadband penetration (see figure 2. 3). In Algeria and Tunisia, fixed broadband is achieving higher penetration rates at relatively higher prices. In the case of Algeria, this is consistent with the absence of a fixed-to-mobile substitution effect resulting from the absence of mobile broadband in the country. In Tunisia, fixed broadband take-up at higher prices may be explained by the same reason since 3G services in Tunisia were introduced relatively recently (2010) and penetration is still quite low (5.10 percent). For both mobile and fixed broadband, similar penetration rates are achieved at comparable levels of broadband price as a percentage of overall average income, that is, around 25-30 percent. The affordability of broadband for the poorest members of the population is explored further in box 2.4. Affordability of broadband services is an important outcome of the implementation of the policy objectives, while each development phase of the broadband market can be characterized by the relative importance of the three core policy objectives described above: access, adoption, and competition. Bearing this in mind, specific regulatory and policy initiatives will be needed to facilitate
Box 2.4 Affordability of Broadband for the Poorest
Let us consider some examples of countries in the emerging stage of market development and look at the percentage of disposable income that the poorest segment of the population would need to spend to afford broadband. For instance, a representative household in the lowest 40 percent income bracket of Morocco would need to pay about one-third of its disposable income to afford mobile broadband (table B2.4.1). That same family would need to spend about 30 percent of its disposable income to afford fixed broadband services. The situation is only slightly better for the bottom 60 percent of the Moroccan population measured by income. Mobile broadband would require about 26 percent of their disposable income, and fixed broadband would require 23 percent of disposable income. In spite of important reforms undertaken by Morocco, a leader in many respects, broadband services are still unaffordable for the majority of the population. Even so, Morocco is the best performer in this group.
The situation is worse for other MENA countries in the emerging broadband development phase. In Tunisia, the poorest 40 percent of the population would need to spend over 40 percent of their disposable income to afford mobile or fixed broadband. In the Republic of Yemen, the poorest 40 percent of the population would need to spend over half of their income for mobile broadband and 46 percent of their income to pay for fixed broadband. In Djibouti, a mobile broadband package is a multiple of the disposable income of the poorest 40 percent and 60 percent of the population, and fixed broadband would absorb roughly the whole income of the poorest 60 percent of the population. In countries classified in the "emerging" broadband development phase (Algeria, Djibouti, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the Republic of Yemen), both fixed and mobile broadband services are far from being affordable for at least 60 percent of the population. the development of the broadband market from one phase to another. At each phase of market development, the broadband penetration rate is fostered by different drivers. It is important therefore to understand the logic behind the broadband market development and correctly identify the level of market maturity in a given country in order for proposed policy measures to be adequate and capable of accelerating market development. Countries at the emerging development stage (Stage 1: Emerging) can be characterized by weak (or absence of) competition associated with low levels of broadband penetration rates, low international connectivity, and an underdeveloped national backbone infrastructure. At this stage of market development, policy decisions should be focused on the objectives of access and competition as a first priority (see figure 2.4). Therefore, opening up the market to competition as well as facilitating open access to infrastructure, along with initiatives related to decreasing costs, are crucial to creating a favorable investment climate and boosting infrastructure rollout. In addition, governments should ensure that all the sectors that may contribute to infrastructure deployment are taken into account and appropriately involved, introducing a much-needed alternative and/or complement to the backbone infrastructure provided by incumbent telecommunications operators (e.g., excess capacity on fiber infrastructure of utility companies, railroads, or electricity grids deployed to sustain their own communication networks). Note: Intensity refers to intensity of policy and regulatory measures that should be dedicated to the core objective.
As the broadband market takes off and the number of market players grows, competitive behavior among the operators will be the main driving force for broadband take-up, driving down prices and competing on value-added services (top-up services, games and entertainment, mobile payments). At this stage of market development (Stage 2: Developing) policy measures should focus on maintaining effective competition in the retail broadband market. Therefore, enhanced ex-ante sector-specific regulation at the wholesale level (i.e., effective, nondiscriminatory, transparent open access to existing networks) accompanied by an independent regulatory authority capable of enforcing it will be essential. Box 2.5 describes the thinking behind ex-ante regulation in more detail. As broadband-specific regulation gains importance, policy interventions and an up-to-date legal framework giving appropriate powers to the independent national regulatory authority become crucial. At this stage, the retail broadband market is characterized mainly by an increasing number of operators and service providers and decreasing broadband access prices as a result of competitive pressure. The competitive pressures will also naturally stimulate infrastructure deployment in high-income, high-density areas, with less economically attractive areas likely remaining underserved at this stage.
Box 2.5 Ex-ante Sector-Specific Regulation in Telecommunications
Ex-ante regulation is anticipatory in nature and directed toward situations where market failures are expected to occur. Therefore, an ex-ante regime is of particular importance for less competitive markets. The objective of ex-ante regulation in the information and communications technology sector is to adopt measures to prevent socially undesirable outcomes or to direct market activity towards desirable ends in light of the anticipated market failure. Taking that into account, ex-ante regulation should be narrowly tailored to address the specific instances of expected market failure.
For instance, it may be expected that an incumbent operator may potentially have an incentive and the means to refuse access (e.g., local loop unbundling, interconnection, and so on) requests from alternative operators. The approach to address such a negative outcome in advance is to impose an ex-ante access obligation on the incumbent operator. In this case, the obligation is adjusted to the specific situation and is applied towards a specific operator.
Over the next decade, ex-ante regulation will likely continue to be targeted at the physical network infrastructure and may begin to address challenges in other areas such as services and applications. Consequently, regulations will likely focus to varying degrees on access networks, backbone, backhaul, and international connectivity.
It is widely recognized that the rationale for ex-ante regulations no longer holds as markets approach a mature stage of development and become more competitive. At that point, gradual fine-tuning or, in some cases, even full withdrawal of targeted ex-ante regulation becomes necessary to better reflect competitive conditions in the market and serve consumer interests. However, this is far from being the case for the vast majority of MENA countries. When market development approaches maturity (Stage 3: Maturity) and economically attractive areas have already been supplied with broadband access, policy decisions should be focused on stimulating and making more effective usage of existing networks. There may nevertheless remain geographic areas where competition forces are unlikely to guarantee broadband availability owing to lack of commercial interest, that is, insufficient social and economic conditions. In addition, broadband may be delivered at prices that make it unaffordable for certain population groups. In those areas, governments should lead the initiative on broadband infrastructure deployment in order to ensure the principle of universal access and to prevent a digital divide.
Clustering Countries According to Their Level of Broadband Development
Fixed Broadband Markets in MENA
Fixed broadband markets in MENA are largely underdeveloped with most being in the emerging development phase. At the end of 2012, in above 50 percent of the MENA countries the fixed broadband penetration rate was no higher than 25 percent, and in only one country did it exceed 70 percent (see figure 2.5). The low penetration rate can be attributed to a number of factors, including a lack of infrastructure, weak or no competition, and high prices for services. But most importantly, when the high take-up of 3G and fourth generation of mobile telecommunications technology (4G) services across the MENA region is taken into account, the development of the fixed broadband market cannot be analyzed separately from the mobile broadband market because of a possible fixed-tomobile substitution effect.
This section clusters MENA countries according to their level of fixed broadband market development and will provides insights into market development circumstances while taking into account technological diversity and development of fixed broadband access networks, fixed broadband and mobile broadband prices (including the fixed-to-mobile substitution effect), level of competition in the fixed broadband market, and finally past policy decisions that could potentially affect present market development. Figure 2 .5 presents the distribution of the MENA countries along the s-curve characterizing the typical development of any product or service market, including the fixed broadband market (see box 2.3). Countries are positioned on the x-axis taking into account respective prices of fixed broadband monthly subscriptions. The level of fixed broadband prices varies greatly across the countries in the emerging market development stage (Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the Republic of Yemen). It would be logical to assume that a low market development should be characterized by higher prices. It is true in the case of Djibouti, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia (circle 1, figure 2.5). However, with the rest of the countries in the emerging phase, the fixed broadband price level varies a lot depending on the country. In some countries, for example, the Republic of Yemen, Iraq, Morocco, and Egypt, despite having low fixed broadband prices, penetration rates are the lowest in the region (circle 2, figure 2.5).
What could cause this diversification of prices across markets? And why are those countries characterized by both a low penetration rate and low prices?
Emerging-stage countries may be roughly split into two groups: (a) low penetration rate and high price; and (b) low penetration rate and low price.
A low penetration rate and high prices in Djibouti, Tunisia, and Algeria, could be explained by monopolistic characteristics of the broadband market and an absent or limited fixed-to-mobile substitution effect. For instance, in the case of Djibouti, high fixed broadband prices could be explained by the absence of competition in the market (see table 2.2). The state has a monopoly for provision of both fixed and mobile services. As well as providing all fixed line and Internet access services, the state-owned company Djibouti Telecom (DT) is also the country's sole provider of mobile telephony services. In the case of Tunisia, the fixed broadband price is relatively high, apparently owing to lack of competition and comparable mobile broadband prices. In the case of Algeria, broadband has 
Figure 2.5 Fixed Broadband Penetration and Access Prices, December 2012
Source: Fixed broadband household penetration-TeleGeography's GlobalComms Database (http://www.telegeography.com, data retrieved August 2013). Note: PPP = purchase power parity. Methodology for price calculation: Prices were collected from public sources (operators' websites); ITU definition for broadband (256 kilobits per second [kbps] downstream) was used; data cap of 1 gigabit (Gb) was considered; the price of the operator with the biggest market share was used. However, if their market share was less than 50 percent, the price of the second-biggest operator was also researched, and the arithmetic mean of the two operators was used; the cheapest offer was selected; prices were collected in January 2013; fixed broadband price in the Syrian Arab Republic from TeleGeography, November 2012.
relatively high prices, most likely because of the lack of competitive pressure and absence of mobile broadband.
Low penetration rates and low prices in Egypt and Morocco can be attributed to the strong fixed-to-mobile substitution effect, and by unsatisfactory offers of fixed broadband services. Indeed, in all these countries mobile broadband markets are highly competitive with at least three 3G operators providing services to the vast majority of the population. As a result of fierce competition, mobile broadband prices are comparable to those of fixed broadband. The fixed-tomobile substitution effect is well observed in the case of Egypt (see figure 2.6) where growth of fixed broadband subscribers is stagnating and mobile broadband is booming. Fixed broadband in Egypt only started to increase at a faster rate in 2012. In the case of other emerging countries, the fixed and mobile subscriber bases are growing and the substitution effect is not as visible as it is in the case of a mature, saturating fixed broadband market (see figure 2.6, panel b, Bahrain). At the same time, emerging fixed broadband markets are much less competitive and are dominated by incumbent fixed operators. Fixed broadband networks are underdeveloped in terms of both coverage and technology. For instance, in the cases of Egypt, Morocco, and Syria, nearly all fixed broadband connections are supplied using digital subscriber line (xDSL) technology over the incumbent operator's network. Fixed broadband subscribers migrate to mobile broadband operators because of the fixed-to-mobile substitution effect, and the resulting competitive pressure keeps fixed broadband prices low. This closed loop could potentially be broken through investments in infrastructure development and an upgrade of fixed broadband networks. This would allow fixed broadband operators to diversify their services in terms of speed and quality from those of mobile operators. Of those economies where there is no substitution observed between fixed and mobile broadband (Iraq, Algeria, the Republic of Yemen, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the West Bank and Gaza), Iraq and the Republic of Yemen currently have 3G services.
In Iraq, one 3G license was issued in just one of the regions for one operator and the majority of the population does not have access to mobile broadband services. In both Iraq and the Republic of Yemen, the mobile broadband market is not competitive. In the Republic of Yemen, the only 3G operator is the stateowned company; in the Islamic Republic of Iran, only one operator was awarded a 3G license in 2012 and mobile broadband is not yet available to the majority of the population.
In Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Republic of Yemen, the poor performance of the fixed broadband market could also be explained by specific policy decisions. In 2010, the government of the Republic of Yemen took the decision to make dial-up Internet access service available to the entire population of the country free of charge in order to encourage greater Internet usage. As a result, the number of Internet subscribers grew significantly. However, toward the end of 2012, less than 30 percent of all Internet subscribers were using broadband to access the Internet while for the majority of Internet subscribers the policy was a disincentive for people to switch to the paid Internet service even if it offered higher speeds. This scenario of low prices (or free service) and a low consumer base will likely not sustain the required investments for technological development of fixed broadband infrastructure in the Republic of Yemen.
In Algeria, lower fixed broadband prices resulted from the government's decision in 2008 to halve the price of xDSL while delaying the award of 3G licenses. The decision was applicable to all the Algerian Internet service providers (ISPs) and was aimed at stimulating broadband usage in the country. Indeed, the number of xDSL subscribers grew by over 100 percent in 2008. However, continued growth did not take place. As in the case of the majority of the countries in the emerging development stage, fixed broadband connections in Algeria are mostly supplied over xDSL, and near absent competition (the share of alternative players was about 0.6 percent at end-2012) cannot sustain further market development. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, in October 2006 the government ordered all of the country's service providers to restrict Internet transmission speeds to 128 kilobits per second (kbps). As of May 2012, the 128 kbps restriction still applied to residential subscribers; higher speeds are available for business and corporate customers. These decisions have potentially hindered technological development toward greater speeds (over 256 kbps); therefore, both connection speeds (mostly supplied over Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access [WiMax] ) and prices are low.
In the cases of Iraq and Libya, the low price can be explained by increasing availability of cheap WiMax subscriptions. However, coverage of those networks remains limited and patchy, and at the same time the connection speeds are relatively low. It may be presumed, therefore, that at some moment in time when operators decide to increase both coverage and speed, prices of retail offers may increase due to the investments needed.
In the case of developing fixed broadband markets, namely West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, Oman, Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, technological diversity is an important factor allowing fixed broadband services to develop. For instance, in Qatar at the end of 2012, over 30 percent of all fixed broadband connections were supplied over fiber-to-the-x (FTTx) technology while in Jordan, over 30 percent of all fixed broadband connections were supplied over WiMax infrastructure with download speeds of up to 5 megabits per second (Mbps). In Saudi Arabia, over 25 percent of all connections are supplied over both FTTx and WiMax. Only in Lebanon, Kuwait, and West Bank and Gaza were nearly 90 percent of all broadband connections supplied through xDSL infrastructure, which is consistent with lower competition in those markets compared to Jordan or Saudi Arabia. Lower prices in Kuwait resulted from the decision of the Ministry of Communications to impose a price cut of up to 40 percent in September 2012 (circle 3, figure 2.5). In the case of Oman, low levels of competition are hindering the development of the fixed broadband (as of December 2012, the market share of incumbent operators measured by number of subscribers was over 60 percent). On top of that, desert terrain and a scattered population present logistical obstacles to deployment of fixed broadband Internet services in Oman. While both fixed and mobile technologies provide services at similar speeds, mobile networks are composed of lighter infrastructure and are therefore easier and less costly to deploy, particularly in areas with difficult terrain. In spite of the creation of a new, open access, national backbone network (Qatar National Broadband Network [QNBN]), limited competition at the access level may explain the high price for fixed broadband access in Qatar (circle 4, figure 2.5). In the United Arab Emirates, prices are higher, which is again most likely the outcome of low levels of competition (the market is dominated by the incumbent operator with a market share above 85 percent, see table B2.4.1 and circle 4, figure 2.5). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia enjoys one of the lowest fixed broadband prices in the region (circle 3, figure 2.5) thanks to facilities-based competition with Saudi Telecom Company (STC) (incumbent operator), which was introduced in August 2004 when alternative operators were granted concessions allowing them to roll out their own network infrastructure (see table 2.3). As of December 2012, the market share of alternative operators measured by number of subscribers was over 60 percent.
In general, countries at the developing stage (with higher household penetration) also demonstrate higher growth, which is consistent with their position on the s-curve (i.e., between the first and second inflections). Jordan is the exception among the countries in the developing stage. The low penetration growth of fixed broadband could be explained by a strong fixed-to-mobile substitution effect. Indeed, after the launch of commercial 3G services in Jordan in September 2010, the annual growth of fixed broadband penetration (nevertheless already slowing down) dropped to -0.5 percent and between 2011 and 2013 was only 2.5 percent (see figure 2.7) .
The mature fixed broadband market of Bahrain, with household penetration rates surpassing 80 percent, is nearing saturation. Similarly, the penetration rate in the United Arab Emirates is close to 70 percent (see table 2.2 for households penetration and figure 2.8 for the shape of the S-curves). However, in Qatar, which also demonstrates high fixed broadband penetration rate (above 65 percent), signs of saturation are yet to be observed. Over 60 percent of all fixed broadband connections in Qatar are still supplied over xDSL, while both Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have the lowest levels of xDSL connections in the region. In the case of Bahrain, the competitive market environment has lessened the dominance of the incumbent operator, Batelco, which provides less than 30 percent of all fixed broadband connections and faces infrastructure-based competition from two alternative operators providing services over their own WiMax infrastructures. The number of fixed broadband connections supplied over xDSL was surpassed by WiMax connections in 2009.
In the case of the United Arab Emirates, the decrease of xDSL connections is caused by a network upgrade and deployment of FTTx infrastructure. In 2010, the number of FTTx connections in the United Arab Emirates surpassed the number of xDSL connections (see figure 2.9). In terms of fixed broadband prices, Bahrain has a more competitive market and also has lower prices.
Conclusions
The majority (10 countries out of 19) of the fixed broadband markets in MENA are in the emerging development phase with a household penetration rate below 25 percent. Five markets are in the developing stage and only one is considered mature. The main reasons for this weak development are low or absent competition and the fixed-to-mobile substitution effect. As a result of weak competition, fixed broadband markets in MENA suffer from low investment and underdeveloped infrastructure in terms of both technology and coverage. Slow fixed broadband connections do not allow the operators to compete with 3G/4G broadband in terms of speed and quality. In some instances, slower take-up of higher speed connections may be a consequence of certain policy decisions.
In a number of countries, the fixed-to-mobile substitution effect is causing slower or even negative growth of fixed broadband penetration. In countries with strong competition in the mobile broadband market (two or three 3G/4G operators), the fixed broadband price is lower (comparable to mobile broadband) than in those where mobile broadband markets are not competitive.
More developed markets demonstrate higher technological diversity and stronger growth. Markets with stronger competition in the fixed broadband market also experience lower prices.
Mobile Broadband Markets in MENA
Mobile broadband markets in MENA are much more developed when compared to their respective fixed broadband markets. Most of the mobile broadband markets are in the developing phase. In most of the MENA countries at the end of 2012, penetration of mobile broadband exceeded 25 percent of the population; in eight it exceeded 50 percent; and in Bahrain the penetration rate exceeded 70 percent (see figure 2.10). Mobile broadband is still not available in Algeria and the West Bank and Gaza. Although 3G is officially operational in Iraq, the only 3G operator is currently restricted to the Kurdistan region, and the majority of Iraqis do not have access to 3G services. 3G services are also not available to, majority of the population in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In both countries, penetration of mobile broadband is below 1 percent of the population (see table 2.5 later in this chapter).
A higher penetration rate is caused by a number of factors, but most importantly by a vibrant competitive market environment. Weaker mobile broadband market development is caused by insufficient competition. Delayed spectrum auctions are the cause of the lack of mobile broadband in Algeria, while obtaining the necessary radio spectrum frequencies from the government of Israel is the reason behind the lack of mobile broadband in the West Bank and Gaza.
This section clusters MENA countries according to their level of mobile broadband market maturity and provides insights into market development circumstances taking into account mobile broadband prices, level of competition in the mobile broadband market, and policy decisions related to spectrum auctioning. Figure 2 .10 presents the distribution of the MENA countries along the s-curve characterizing typical development of any product or service market, including the mobile broadband market. Countries are positioned on the x-axis taking into account respective prices of mobile broadband access. As may be seen from figure 2.10, most of the countries (8 out of 19) have a subscriber penetration rate above 25 percent and below 70 percent, which puts them in the developing stage (see table 2.4). Bahrain is the only country with a penetration rate above 70 percent. The remaining countries are in the emerging market development phase.
In general, the Gulf countries appear to be the early adopters. Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates launched 3G services as early as 2004, and Qatar and Saudi Arabia followed in 2006. Outside the Gulf subregion, Libya launched ) ; data cap of 1 gigabit (Gb) was considered when available; the price of the operator with the biggest market share was used. However, if their market share was less than 50 percent, the price of the second-biggest operator was also researched, and the arithmetic mean of the two operators was used; the cheapest offer was selected; prices were collected in January 2013. figure 2 .11).
In terms of prices, mobile broadband markets are more homogeneous when compared to fixed broadband (see table 2.5), and the overall price level is higher. This price level could be mainly attributed to the intensity of competition in the respective markets. Competition is driven by many factors, including the number of operators, date of entry in the market, and quality of the regulatory framework. Lower penetration rates are also explained by a later date of commercial launch of 3G services.
High prices and low penetration in Libya and Djibouti could be explained by weak or nonexistent competition in the market. In Libya, for instance, the market is divided between two 3G operators which are state-owned companies (Libyana started offering 3G services in September 2006, Al-Madar in March 2007). Also in Libya, mobile networks suffered severe damage during the civil war but were fully restored by November 2012, with an understandable impact on penetration. In Djibouti, the state-owned Djibouti Telecom is the only 3G operator in the country. The low penetration rates (2.22 percent) can be also attributed to the relatively recent launch of 3G services in 2011. Higher prices and low penetration rates in Syria (despite the relatively early launch of 3G services) could be explained by weaker competition in the market divided by two operators, whereas in Tunisia, similar development of penetration and prices could be attributed to a relatively recent launch of 3G services (2010). In the Republic of Yemen, there is low take-up of both fixed and mobile broadband services. Despite this, the prices for mobile broadband are relatively low-one of the factors may be the competitive pressure from free dial-up services. The lack of competition in the mobile broadband market in the Republic of Yemen (there is only one 3G operator), 
Conclusions
Eight countries out of the 19 mobile broadband markets in MENA are in the developing phase with the subscriber penetration rate exceeding 25 percent (see table 2.5). Six markets are in the emerging stage, with just one in the mature stage. In four countries, mobile broadband services are not available at all or are not available to the majority of the population.
The main reason for the rapid development of mobile broadband markets is the presence of effective competition. While fixed broadband markets in MENA suffer from low investment and underdeveloped infrastructure, in terms of both technology and coverage owing to weak competition, mobile broadband markets are developing increasingly well in terms of both penetration and coverage. Therefore, higher take-up in some instances could be observed at a higher price level when compared to the fixed broadband market.
Further development of mobile broadband will require additional spectrum allocations. As of December 2012, only four countries in MENA had launched commercial 4G services. Before the fourth quarter of 2013, three more countries will have launched commercial 4G networks.
More developed markets also have stronger growth. Markets with stronger competition in the mobile broadband market also have lower prices.
Aggregate Broadband Development Clustering of MENA Countries
Taking an overall view of both fixed and mobile broadband markets, 10 out of 19 MENA countries are in the emerging phase (see table 2.6). Infrastructure deployment and development of competition are the main challenges for those countries in both fixed and mobile broadband markets. 
